"Crisis, Credibility and Corporate History". Book review by Watson, Tom
Crisis, Credibility and Corporate History 
Reviewer: 
Tom Watson (Faculty of Media and Communication, Bournemouth University, Poole, UK) 
Citation: 
Tom Watson, (2015) "Crisis, Credibility and Corporate History", Corporate Communications: An 
International Journal, Vol. 20 Iss: 4, pp.518 - 520 
DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/CCIJ-02-2015-0007 
Review Number: 
2015/1 
Review Subject: 
Crisis, Credibility and Corporate History Edited by Bieri, A. 
Publisher Name: 
International Council on Archives Studies, Liverpool University Press 
Place of Publication: 
Liverpool 
Publication Year: 
2014 
Publisher: 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
Article 
Corporate history – authenticity needs archives and honesty 
 
Corporate history is an area of scholarship and publishing that has a mixed reputation and is also an activity that 
is under-represented in management thinking and corporate communication. It can have the ring of authenticity 
when company leaders allow unfortunate or plain wrong past actions to be written about, alongside the progress 
and social contribution that the company believes it has made. Or it can be a bland timeline of inexorable 
progress that is dry and frankly unbelievable. 
For those wanting to explore the roles of company history, archives and archivists, guidance on how company 
histories can be prepared and the historiographical debate, this book of edited chapters from a 2013 conference 
is a helpful starting point. However, for historians of management, business disciplines and communication, it has 
valuable case studies on how to negotiate, manage, structure and write successful company histories. 
The chapters are the proceedings of the Symposium of the International Council on Archives, Section on 
Business and Labour Archives which met in Basel, Switzerland. It thus has a European focus, although there is a 
Japanese case study which will be referred to later. There are five sections, with a total of 12 papers. 
The sections are, broadly, an introduction to the historiographical debate; the role of in-house archivists in 
curating and writing corporate history; the challenges in writing corporate histories; broader approaches to 
corporate history-telling; and case studies from Roche, IBM and Toyota. 
As a practicing communication historian, my interest and that I suspect of many readers will be in the sections 
and chapters that discuss real-world of negotiations with company leaders who have a quite natural disposition to 
seek a positive story about their organization in the belief that it will enhance its image. This book is more than a 
set of best practice guidelines but the “history of some histories” tells “how not to” as well as “how to”. 
As Jonathan Steffen, in the opening chapter, notes when paraphrasing the English historian E.H. Carr: “History is 
there for us to learn from our mistake, whatever the nature of those mistakes might have been” (p. 10). It is the 
companies that choose to overlook their mistakes that turn corporate history into either a process of delusion or 
reputation damage. It becomes a hagiography, “a hero or martyr epic designed to glorify heroes or saints, 
irrespective of how the central characters lived their lives” (Possing, p. 55), with the corporate emphasis on the 
heroic leader and constant progress. Recently, I read a corporate biography of the founder of a leading 
international public relations consultancy group. It was well-presented and illustrated; it has value in telling a 
version of how US public relations groups expanded worldwide from the 1960s onwards but, as it was written by 
a former staff member of the consultancy, it lacked the sparkle of objectivity and authenticity. The founder of the 
organization was presented in a heroic manner, not absurdly so but he just never seemed to make an error and 
was loved by all. 
However, Clemens Wischermann’s example of a 1986 corporate history of Daimler-Benz that “ignored the issue 
of forced labour” (p. 16) in the Nazi era demonstrated how less-than-full disclosure can cause a decade of 
problems. For although the company and its external historians later produced a study on the use and treatment 
of forced labourers, Wischermann notes that the initial corporate history was a “PR disaster” and “reflected the 
social awareness of the German public at the time” (p. 16). 
Another German organization, which also prospered from 1933 to 1945, was the Gunther Quandt group which is 
now best known as an important shareholder in the carmaker, BMW. It chose not to obscure its past and 
commissioned an academic historian, Joachim Scholtyseck, to write a corporate history from its foundation to 
1954. Scholtyseck’s chapter is interesting to read for its summary of the Quandt family’s progress before, during 
and after Second World War and for the discussion of the ethics of beneficial participation in a regime in your 
homeland which was corrupt and inhumane, which “gives us food for thought”. It is also valuable as case study 
on the negotiation of the writing of such histories. Scholtyseck was able to negotiate free access to corporate 
archives and an assurance that the Quandts would publish the results of his study. They honoured their 
commitments, “as I was sure they would”, the historian “included [them] in the written agreement” (p. 64). 
Not all company history projects are as challenging as these examples, which come from an appalling period in 
world history, but there are other examples of companies which still contend with disasters from decades ago, 
such as Hoffman-La Roche’s release of dioxins from its Seveso plant in Italy in 1976. Now known as Roche, its 
“Historical Collection and Archive is committed to reappraising Seveso” (Jungkind, p. 49), which demonstrates 
the value of corporate archives is maintaining institutional memory in an accurate and informed manner. On a 
more positive note, the Danish A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S transport and energy group has a Group Historical 
Documentation service “which supplies its product into the Group’s communication efforts and as such must 
support the communication strategy” (Morgen, p. 28). 
The final case study comes from carmaker Toyota, which illustrates a different cultural perspective and is this 
writer’s first reading of the application of a quality assurance (kaizen) approach to the preparation of historical 
material. Toyota followed the shashi model, which was developed in the nineteenth century and is essentially a 
company-written history drawn from its own archives. Shashi are published by Japanese companies and 
distributed to stakeholders as gifts. The Toyota approach, which used the services of its own archivists, was 
taken forward by an editorial committee of 30 managers from different parts of the organization which met 
biannually to decide on direction, content and mediums of distribution. After six years of QA-assisted preparation, 
the history of Toyota’s first 75 years, 75 Years of Toyota: Ever-better Cars, was launched. It was organized in 
three timeline chapters and also gave the lineage of every vehicle produced by the company. However, the 
“Ever-better” cars theme does not appear to cover the millions of cars recalled from 2009 to 2011, which have 
damaged Toyota’s previous reputation for dependable cars. 
Every organization of substance has a history: the writing of corporate history can play an important role in 
building and defending brands and reputations. However, Crisis, Credibility and Corporate History demonstrated 
that there needs to be both honesty in the expression of that history in order to demonstrate authenticity, as well 
as investment in archives, archivists and production of historical outputs in print, visual materials and online. The 
“About” paragraph or two on the corporate web site is not sufficient, as this edited collection demonstrates with 
variety and accessibility. 
 
